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1 GAME
Let’s play a game. I will describe it first at an abstract level, leaving until later (sections 2-6) the
surprisingly vexed question of how to fill in details, given that our intuitions shift when the “same”
game is expounded differently.
Your job is to choose between options A and B. A can done in one or more ways , B in one or
more ways . The options overlap in that each way  of B-ing extends to two ways ⋆ and ⋆ of
A-ing, and each way  of A-ing is a ⋆ or ⋆ for some way  of B-ing.1Now the rewards. Each  wins you a penny, and likewise each ⋆. Both are as good as worthless,and worthless is the name we will know them by. The remaining s — the ⋆s — win you a million
dollars. The ⋆s are the lucrative s.
This leaves a lot to the imagination, of course. But we can see already that A is a better option than
B. I say this not because I have done expected utility calculations — those are not possible because
we haven’t been given probabilities. I say it because A in a good sense dominates B:
1. some ways  of A-ing — the ⋆s — win you more than any way  of B-ing does
2. no way  of B-ing wins you more than any way  of A-ing does.
I haven’t said what kind of control you have over how A is realized. Again it doesn’t much matter.
Maybe an  is assigned to you randomly; maybe it’s up to you which  occurs. A is a better choice
than B either way, given dominance. I assume you would try to the extent possible to exercise option
A in a lucrative way ⋆, rather than a worthless way ⋆. The argument for picking A over B does notdepend on this.
2 SWITCHES
You are presented with two switches, one on the left and one on the right. Option B is flipping the left
switch (Lefty). Option A is flipping either both switches (Lefty and Righty) or just Lefty (B in the
obvious notation is L, A is LR∨LR̄.) Both switches must be flipped for the light to come on, which
wins you $1,000,000; one switch wins you a penny; flipping neither switch leaves you with nothing.
Letting → be some suitable arrow,
1The overlap is for convenience. We can arrange for A and B to be incompatible, e.g. by letting A be done on Saturday







B’s truthmakers  correspond to the ways  of flipping Lefty; it will be simplest to pretend there
is just one of these, and one way  of flipping Righty. A’s truthmakers  are ⋆ =  and ⋆ = ̄. will for convenience be identified with  and the s with  and ̄.2 Pulling these threads together,
A = LR∨LR̄ = You flip both switches or just Lefty.
B = L = You flip Lefty .
the s are the ways  of flipping Lefty.
the s are the ways  of flipping Lefty with Righty and ̄ of flipping Lefty without Righty.
the ⋆s are the s whereby you flip Righty.
the ⋆s are the s whereby you don’t flip Righty.
each ⋆ gets (guarantees) you $1,000,000.
no ⋆ gets you $1,000,000; likewise no  gets you that much.
(2)
Does this way of filling in the details have the features we wanted, set out in section 1?
• “each way  of B-ing extends to two ways  of A-ing”
– yes, each  extends both to  and ̄
– these are both ways of A-ing, that is, of (LR∨LR̄)-ing
• “each way  of A-ing is a ⋆ or ⋆, for some way  of B-ing”
– yes, both  and ̄ (the s) extend 
–  is a ⋆ (⋆)-type extension if it contains  (̄)
• “no  wins you $1,000,000, and likewise no ⋆”
– it is not the case that the reward for flipping Lefty is $1,000,000
– nor is $1,000,000 the reward for flipping only Lefty
• “the rest of the s — the ⋆s — do win you a million dollars”
– yes, $1,000,000 is the reward for flipping Lefty and Righty
From this it seems that A is a better option than B. Done right, the way, it brings in $1,000,000.
No ways of B-ing are so lucrative. The reward for B-ing (done the only way it can be done, ) is $.01.
2Even bracketing this identification, flipping both cannot be considered a way of flipping Lefty; compare flipping Lefty
within five miles of a burning barn. Flipping Lefty without Righty is not a way of flipping Lefty either. (The reason, looking
ahead to section 13, is that one doesn’t flip Lefty by flipping it near a burning barn. Nor is it a truthmaker for You flip Lefty
that you flip Lefty near a burning barn; the sentence isn’t true by virtue of your doing that. For more on this and related topics
(proportionality, relevance, exact truthmaking), see Yablo [2014], chapter 4; Fine [2017]; and Yablo [2022?].
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3 APPLES
A more intriguing example builds on a case of Kit Fine’s. Alternative Eden has infinitely many
apples ai. All but one are stamped with the Holy Seal of Approval, indicating it is safe to eat. Theone remaining apple is badapple. Eating badapple angers God to such an extent that he ruins your
life and the lives of your children and theirs, never letting the matter drop as generation follows upon
generation.
One gets into the neighborhood of the game sketched in section 1 by letting A be eating almost
all of the apples (all but a finite number, “cofinitely many” in the jargon), and B be eating almost all
apples distinct from badapple.3 Eating almost all regular apples (apples distinct from badapple)
gets you a penny, let’s say. Eating almost all regular apples and badapple too wins you knowledge
of good and evil, valued conventionally at a million dollars. (The “bad” in our version means not
that the apple is bad, but that it confers knowledge of badness — which is good.) The game may now
be described as follows (b is badapple):
A = You eat almost all apples.
B = You eat almost all regular apples—almost all apples b aside.
each  is of the form: eating a certain cofinite array of apples, e.g. all but a5.
each  is of the form: eating a cofinite array of regular apples, e.g. all but a5.
each ⋆ is an  wherein you eat b.
each ⋆ is an  wherein you don’t eat b.
each ⋆ gets you $1,000,000.
no ⋆ gets you $1,000,000; likewise no  gets you that much.
(3)
Does this way of filling in the details have the features we wanted?
• “each way  of B-ing extends to two ways  of A-ing”
– yes, since eating a bunch of regular apples extends in twoways to eating a bunch of apples
– one extension has you eating (chewing) b, the other has you eschewing b
• “each way  of A-ing is a ⋆ or ⋆, for some way  of B-ing”
– yes, each way of eating almost all apples extends a way  of eating almost all ≠ b
– it’s a ⋆ (⋆)-style extension if  has you eating (not eating) b
• “no  wins you a penny, and likewise no ⋆s”
– a penny is the reward for eating cofinitely many regular apples
– and the reward too for eating cofinitely many apples none of which is b
• “all other s — all ⋆s — win you a million dollars”
– yes, $1,000,000 is the reward for eating cofinitely many apples of which one is b
As before, A looks like a better option than B. Done right, it brings in $1,000,000; there are no ways
of B-ing that bring in $1,000,000.
3If we want A and B to be incompatible, this can be arranged by putting A on one day and B on another. Or there could be




Consider now a game analogous to, but prime facie distinct from GAME. The specifics are laid out
this time in terms of worlds w where a sentence is true, rather than ways for it to be true.
Your job is to choose between options A and B. A is true in all and only the as, B in all and only
the bs. Given that S is true in w iff it has in w a truthmaker , w is an a iff some  obtains there, and
a b iff some  obtains in w; but this is a side-remark, no part of GAME’s definition.
Now the rewards. A-worlds a come in two types, those a⋆ where you win $1,000,000, and those
a⋆ where you win $.01. B-worlds are typed correspondingly. They divide into those b⋆ where youwin $1,000,000, and those b⋆ where you win $.01.This leaves a lot to the imagination, of course. But we have seen no reason to think A preferable to
B. I say this not because I have done expected utility calculations; that would not have been possible
in the absence of probabilities . I say it because A does not dominate B in GAME as it did in GAME.
The case for dominance in GAME was this, for randomly chosen s and s:
AB1:  wins you at least as much, and sometimes more than,  does.
AB2. ¬ ( wins you at least as much, and sometimes more than,  does).
The corresponding argument where GAME is concerned would proceed from analogous assumptions
re randomly chosen as and bs that
AB1. a wins you at least as much, and perhaps more than, b does
AB2. ¬ (b wins you at least as much, and perhaps more than, a does).
But although AB2 is correct, the “at least as much” claim in AB1 is false — the a⋆s win you lessthan the b⋆s. For you by hypothesis win $.01 in each a⋆, and $1,000,000 in each b⋆.Another way to see that AB1 must fail is this. AB1 assumes that there are “extra” A-worlds a, A-worlds where B is false.4 How otherwise could there be A-worlds where you wind up richer than in
any B-world? Yet as we’re about to see, extra A-worlds simply do not exist in the worldly analogues
of SWITCHES and APPLES. A world where you flip Lefty with or without Righty is ipso facto a world
where you flip Lefty. (And vice versa.) That every A-world is a B-world — if the A-worlds just are
the B-worlds — then clearly no A-worlds exist that make you richer than any B-world does.
5 SWITCHES
For a sense of how GAME might work in practice, we look for an analogue of SWITCHES centering
on the worlds w where, say, You flip Lefty and Righty, or Lefty without Righty is true, rather than its
ways of being true:
A = You flip Lefty.
B = You flip Lefty and Righty, or else just Lefty
each a is a w where you flip Lefty with Righty, or else without Righty
each b is a w where you flip Lefty
each b⋆ is an a where you flip Righty in addition to Lefty
each b⋆ is a a where you flip Lefty but not in addition Righty
in each b⋆, you get $1,000,000.
in each b⋆, you get at most a penny.
(4)
4As there were extra A-ways, s not identical to any .
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This is similar to SWITCHES in that we are confronted in both with same options A, B; and the payoffs
are the same as well, no matter how we conduct ourselves:
flip both switches $1,000,000
flip exactly one switch $.01
flip neither switch $0
Table 1: SWITCHES Payoffs
If the games are that similar, onemight expectA to dominateB in SWITCHES as it did in SWITCHES.
The argument in SWITCHES was, where  () ranges over ways of flipping Lefty (Righty),  is either
 or , and  = ,
AB1 a randomly chosen way  of flipping Lefty with or without Righty wins youat least as much as, and perhaps more than, a randomly chosen way  of flipping Lefty
AB2. ¬ (a randomly chosen way  of flipping Lefty wins you at least as much as,and perhaps more than, a randomly chosen way  of flipping Lefty with or without Righty)
The corresponding argument for SWITCHES would go like this
AB1. a randomly chosen world a where you flip Lefty with or without Righty makes youat least as rich as, and perhaps richer than, a randomly chosen world b where you flip Lefty
AB2. a randomly chosen world b where you flip Lefty makes you at least as rich as, andperhaps richer than, a randomly chosen world a where you flip Lefty with or without Righty.
AB2 is true because some worlds where you flip Lefty with or without Righty make you a million-aire (on account of your flipping both); that’s the best that occurs in any world, a fortiori as good as
occurs in any world where you flip Lefty. But AB1, if you think about it, is NOT true. Among worldswhere you flip Lefty are some where you flip it with Righty; in these you come out a millionaire.
No worlds whatever make you richer than that, so in particular none where you flip Lefty make you
richer than that.
An easier way to see that AB1 must fail is that it requires the existence “extra” A-worlds, A-worldswhere B is false. But a world where you flip Lefty with or without Righty is ipso facto a world where
you flip Lefty. And vice versa. That the A-worlds are just some (in fact, all) of the B-worlds entails
that no a makes you richer than every b.
6 APPLES
Consider now a game like APPLES but prime facie distinct from APPLES. The rules are stated once
again in terms of worlds where a sentence holds, rather than ways for it to hold,.
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A = You eat cofinitely many apples.
B = You eat cofinitely many regular apples— apples distinct from badapple.
each a is a w where you eat cofinitely many apples, e.g., all but a5
each b is a w where you eat cofinitely many regular apples, e.g., all but a5
each b⋆ is an a where you eat badapple
each b⋆ is an a where you don’t eat badapple
in each b⋆, you get $1,000,000.
in each b⋆, you get at most a penny.
(5)
The new game is similar to APPLES in that we choose between the same two options (A, B) and the
payoffs are unchanged as well:
eat cofinitely many apples including badapple $1,000,000
eat cofinitely many apples not including badapple $.01
eat fewer than cofinitely many apples $.00
Table 2: APPLES Payoffs
To run through a by now familiar dialectic, one might expect that Awould be a better option than
B in APPLES as it was in APPLES. Supporting A over B in APPLES, recall, was a dominance argument
AB1. a randomly chosen way  of eating almost all apples wins you at least as much as, and possibly(if  involves b) more than, a randomly chosen way  of eating almost all apples ≠ b
AB2. ¬ (a randomly chosen way  of eating almost all apples ≠ b wins you at least as much as, andpossibly more than, a randomly chosen way  of eating almost all apples)
The corresponding thought now would be
AB1. a randomly chosen a where you eat almost all apples makes you at least as rich, and possiblyricher than, a randomly chosen way b where you eat almost all regular apples
AB2. ¬ (a randomly chosen b where you eat almost all regular apples makes you at least as rich, andpossibly richer than, a randomly chosen a where you eat almost all apples)
AB2 is true because some worlds where you eat almost all apples make you a millionaire; that’sthe best that occurs in any world. But AB1 is NOT true. Among worlds where you eat almost all ais
≠ b, there are some where you eat b too; in these you’re a millionaire. No worlds whatever make you
richer than that. Hence in particular none where you eat almost all apples make you richer.
An easier way to see that AB1, must fail is this. AB1 requires the existence of “extra” A-worlds,
A-worlds where B is false.5 But any world where you eat almost all apples is ipso facto a world where
you eat almost all of them badapple aside. And vice versa. (A single apple can’t make the difference
between cofinitely many and not cofinitely many.) If the A-worlds just are the B-worlds, then clearly
no A-world makes you richer than does any B-world.
5As there were extra A-ways, ways to eat almost all apples that were not ways of eating almost all apples ≠ b.
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7 Contradiction (?)
The story so far: Two game-types have been been sketched, one pitting A against B in a worldly
setting (GAB), the other pitting A against B in a, so to speak, wayward setting (GAB). A dominanceargument favors A over B in GAB , but no similar argument suggests itself for A over B in GAB . Andthere are reasons to doubt such an argument is possible: A and B are necessarily equivalent.
Why belabor all this? Players are confronted in each game with the same two options, A and
B. And whichever switches they flip — apples they eat — they come away with the same reward.
Decision problems that present you with the same options, and pay out the same regardless, would
seem to be identical. (Where else would one look for a difference between them apart from options
and payoffs?) If GAB and GAB present us with the same deliberative predicament, then there shouldpresumably be a single truth as to what rational agents should do in that predicament. Is option A
rationally preferable, or is it not?
There is, to say it again, a difference in how the options are presented. The choice between A and
B was framed first in terms of ways of A-ing and B-ing, then in terms of worlds where A, B, obtain.
The worlds are the same. Condition A (Lefty is switched with or without Righty; cofinitely many
apples are eaten) is satisfied if and only condition B (Lefty is flipped; cofinitely many tree-of-life
apples are eaten) is satisfied. That is why A looks no better or worse that B on the worldly framing.
But the ways in which these conditions are met are not the same. Eating all the apples including
badapple is a way of eating cofinitely many apples, but not a way of eating cofinitely many badapple
aside That is why A strikes us from a wayward perspective as a better option than B.
Can the duck/rabbit aspect here be written off as just a curiosity? A looks better than B seen
through way-glasses, but not world-glasses. It would not be the first time beauty was chased backed
to the eye of the beholder. But we are talking not about beauty here but decision making. And it is
not clear that frame-relativity is a tolerable option in this case. Is there really no fact of the matter as
to whether A is more advisable than B?
Whatever one thinks about relativism/non-factualism elsewhere, they are hard to swallow in a
case like ours, where both perspectives are available and we have only the one chance to act. I for
one would not want to get into the habit of defending my choices by saying that I was seeing the figure
just then as a rabbit rather than a duck, or thinking of the glass for whatever reason as half-empty
rather than half-full, or letting myself be guided by the operation’s 80% success rate rather than the
fact that one of five patients dies on the table. I would rather try to decide, when it comes anyway to
worldly vs wayward framings, which of the two leads to the right results.
8 Intensionalism
To put the point less untendentiously: Suppose that eating cofinitely many apples is preferable to
eating cofinitely many distinct from badapple, given that without badapple you are out of luck
reward-wise Then the standard worldly framing of A vs B is just wrong.
How would one attempt to establish this? A first pass argument, using APPLES rather than
switches, might be constructed as follows:
[1] Eating almost all apples is a better option than eating almost all ≠ b (A≻B).
[2] A and B are intensionally equivalent, so on the worldly framing identical.
[3] Intensionalism identifies options one of which is better than the other. [1][2]
[4] Intensionalism gets it wrong. [3]
The only really controversial premise here is [1]: A ≻ B. Fortunately the logic of preference has
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a lot to tell us about statements of this type.6 First a bit of ground clearing. Options X and Y are
hyper-equivalent (short for “hyperintensionally” equivalent) if each way of exercising the one is a
way of exercising the other, and vice versa.7 It should be clear that
Eating almost all apples (A) is hyper-equivalent to:
eating almost all ≠ b (B), or eating almost all and eating b (6)
Writing B⋆ be the second disjunct on the last line — eating cofinitely many apples of which one is
badapple — (6) says that A is hyper-equivalent to B∨B⋆. In symbols,
A ≅ (B∨B⋆). (7)
This is interesting; for on the hand, hyper-equivalents would seem to be evaluatively indis-
cernible, while on the other, a disjunction’s value would seem to flow in some natural, monotonic,
way, from the values of its disjuncts. If A agrees in value with B∨B⋆, then since B⋆ is clearly better
than A (bringing the maximal reward every time), B will have to be worse than A, which is just what
[1] says). Alternatively we could argue like this: B is worth less than B⋆, since it leaves you (unlike
B⋆) sometimes with only a penny. But then B ought to be worth less too than B ∨ B⋆. But this is
the same (up to hyper-equivalence) as being worth less than A! Of course A ≻ B is the premise that
needed bolstering.
Let’s now try to develop the case for A ≻ B more carefully. The first assumption we’ll need is
that hyper-equivalents are equally valuable. Writing X ≈ Y for X ⪰ Y and Y ⪰ Y,
(HYC) if X ≅ Y, then X ≈ Y. (8)
(The label (HYC) is to remind us of what it says: hyperequivalence is a “congruence” with respect
to preference- relations.) The second assumption goes back to Castañeda [1969]. von Wright had
proposed in the early 1960s that X∨Y ≻ Z only if X ≻ Z and Y ≻ Z.8 Castaneda finds this requirement
too strict:
[it] leads to the incomparability of X∨Y with Z, where, say, Value(X) = 1,000; Value(Y)
= 20, and Value(Z) = 20. In a case like this it seems to be more satisfactory to say that
the value of X∨Y is greater than the value of Z (Castañeda [1969], 258-9).
(Similarly it seems better to treat X as preferable to Y∨Z in cases where X and Y are tied and X ≻
Z.) Applying this thought to the case where options agree in value because they’re identical, we get
Castaneda’s Principle: If X ≻ Y, then X ≻ X∨Y ≻ Y.
Actually, we will need given (HYC) to state the principle a bit more cautiously. X∨Y is not going
to be preferable to Y if the two are hyper-equivalent! And they will be hyper-equivalent, if X’s ways
of holding are a subset of Y’s ways of holding. E.g., let X = $10 and Y = $10 ∨ $1. Then X ≻ Y, it
seems, but X∨Y⊁ Y, because Y and X∨Y are hyper-equivalent. The proper formulation of Castaneda’s
idea is
(CAP) If X ≻ Y, then X∨Y ≻ Y (assuming X∨Y ≇ Y) and X ≻ X∨Y (assuming X∨Y ≇ X) (9)
And now we reasons as follows, starting from the fact that B⋆ (eating cofinitely many apples whileNOT eating badapple) is quite definitely worse than B⋆ (eating cofinitely many apples while eating
badapple):
6Notable contributions are Von Wright [1963], Rescher [1968], Chisholm and Sosa [1966], Castañeda [1969], Hansson
[2001]
7Compare Fine’s notion of exact equivalence in, for instance, Fine [2015].
8Von Wright [1963]
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[1] B⋆ ≻ B⋆ ⋆ get you $1,000,000; ⋆ gets you $.01
[2] B⋆ ≻ (B⋆∨B⋆) [1], (CAP), B⋆ ≇ (B⋆∨B⋆)
[3] B ≅ (B⋆∨ B⋆) inspection
[4] B⋆ ≻ B [2][3], (HYC)
[5] (B⋆∨B) ≻ B [4], (CAP), B ≇ (B⋆∨B)
[6] A ≅ (B⋆∨B) inspection, (6)
[7] A ≻ B [3][4], (HYC)
The case this makes for A ≻ B— eating cofinitely many apples ≻ eating cofinitely many ≠ b—
seems pretty strong. Our anti-intentionalism is therefore on strong ground too; it rests mainly on A
≻ B. The practice of running dominance arguments only in terms of worlds, and treating the failure
of world-based dominance as somehow the end of the story, is beginning to look like a mistake.
9 Objections and Replies
Now we run through a series of objections, partly in hopes of countering them, partly to clarify what
the difference is supposed to be between the orthodox (worldly) approach to decision-making and
the approach in terms of ways.
9.1 The Same Worlds?
You keep on saying that the A-worlds are the B-worlds. Given that the s are A’s truthmakers, an
A-world (B-world) is a w where you act -ly for some  (-ly for some ). Hence we have the same
worlds twice only if
You act -ish-ly in a world (for some ) iff you act -ish-ly in that world (for some ). (10)
Is (10) plausible? Maybe not; for there are ways of A-ing whereby you eat more apples than
contemplated in any way of B-ing. Let w for instance be a world where you eat all the apples. Eating
all the apples is a way of eating cofinitely many apples, so w is a world where you act -ly for some .
It does not look however like a world where you act -ly for any . Eating all the apples (badapple
included) is on your theory not a way of eating cofinitely many apples ≠ badapple.
Reply 1: This is a perceptive comment, but not so perceptive as to inspire doubts about the as
identity with the bs. It is true that w is not by virtue of being a world where you eat all the apples a
-world; for eating all of them is not a way of eating cofinitely many distinct from badapple. But
w might qualify another way. w is also a world where you eat all the apples ≠ badapple, notwith-
standing that that’s not all you do there. Eating all the apples ≠ badapple IS (unlike eating all the
apples) a way of eating cofinitely many apples ≠ badapple. You do therefore enact a  in w. That 
is eating all the apples ≠ badapple, not (what is admittedly also done) eating all the apples
But wait — do you perform that ? It may seem that to eat a bunch of apples ≠ badapple, you
have to NOT eat badapple.
I reply that not eating badapple is only implicated by “she ate all the apples ≠ badapple,”
not implied. Eating all of the apples ≠ badapple may purport conversationally to be a complete
description of your activities. But this has nothing to do with its literal content.9 You may where
literal content is concerned eat all the apples distinct from it, and then go ahead and eat badapple
9The debate in linguistics about covert exhaustivity operators could be relevant here; this is not the time.
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too. Doing the both together is not a way of eating cofinitely many apples ≠ badapple. But that does
not stop it from taking place in worlds where you eat cofinitely many apples ≠ badapple. A world
where you  is one where you at least , not (or not necessarily) a world where that is all you do.
9.2 Dominance Lost?
The claimwas that A dominates B due to the existence of ways  of A-ing that earn you $1,000,000, in
the absence of ways  of B-ing that earn you that much. Isn’t this called into question if there are ways
of B-ing that can you earn you that much if done properly — if done, that is, along with badapple-
eating? In fact every way of B-ing earns you that much if accompanied with badapple-eating. How
does A still dominate B if each  leaves it still open to me to win $1,000,000?
Reply 2: The worry is that A should not count as dominating B unless (#) there is a way  of
A-ing such that  guarantees a better result than any  even allows. This condition is not met since
eating all apples distinct from badapple is a  that allows for a big payday (all s do; they put only
a lower bound on which apples are eaten). Hence eating all apples including badapple does not
(definitely) beat . If (#) is an appropriate condition on dominance, then A does not dominate B.
Should we agree that A dominates B only if there is an  such that the best -worlds are for
all  better than the best -worlds? I don’t see why. ’s superiority over the s may lie not in its
guaranteeing more than any  allows, but its guaranteeing more than any  guarantees. To see how
(#) lets us down here, note that one could equally say of burping what has just been said in defense
of B-ing. Burping too earns you $1,000,000 when done right — “right” here meaning, after eating
cofinitely many apples including badapple. I am not sure it should bother us that eating cofinitely
many apples of which one is badapple fails to (#)-dominate eating cofinitely many≠ badapple, when
it does not (#)-dominate burping either, despite being clearly dominant in the sense that matters to
rational decision-making.
Now, eating cofinitely many apples ≠ badapple is admittedly not as useless as burping. For
although it’s the s, not the s, that bring in the reward, each  contains a . One can win the big
bucks without burping, but not without B-ing.
This does admittedly give B-ing an advantage over burping. But the choice we face is between
B-ing and A-ing. And when it comes to this choice, there is really no contest. That each  gets us
part of the way to locking in $1,000,000 can hardly prevent A from dominating B, if some s get us
all the way to locking in $1,000,000 (and no  does).
It appears then thatA does, in a good, deliberation-guiding, sense dominateB after all, never mind
that for each way  of B-ing, some -worlds are as good as they come. It’s enough that choosing A
potentially guarantees you a big-payday world; each ⋆ suffices for one. Choosing B only keeps you
in the running for a big-payday world. There are no s whatever such that  $1,000,000. The best
that can be said about any of them is that  $1,000,000 has non-zero probability. Depending on
how closeness is judged, there’s a chance you’d eat badapple supererogatorily as it were, in addition
to the cofinitely many regular apples you are called on to eat by .
9.3 Just a Chance?
“There’s a chance you’d eat badapple” — quite the understatement. It ignores how the B-chooser,
Bina call her, would actually exercise her chosen option. Certainly there are no s such that Bina
must eat b (and so win $1,000,000) if she s. But that is just to say just that  does not strictly imply
winning $1,000,000;  ⇏ $1,000,000. And the question of what Bina would do/win concerns not
strict implication ⇒ but counterfactual implication.
Knowing as she does that eating badapple too will bring her a huge reward, it stands to reason
that Bina would, if she ’d, supplement that so far non-renumerative activity with some b-eating.
Which suggests that  $1,000,000 has probability 1. Bina could if she played her cards wrong
enact  without winning $1,000,000. But she would play her cards right.
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Why does this matter? Well, we assumed, when arguing that A≻ B, that $1,000,000≻ B. We said
in defense of this assumption that B doesn’t guarantee Bina $1,000,000, while $1,000,000 obviously
does guarantee her $1,000,000. But, whether B guarantees her a big reward seems irrelevant to the
question of choiceworthiness, if a big reward is what she’d get in fact. Pie-or-poison is every bit as
good an option as pie, if the outcome either way is the same: you wind up eating pie. The causal
decision theorist takes a similar line, when she defines an act X’s expected utility as
(CDT) U(X) = ΣO pr(X O) × V(O). (11)
.
U(B⋆∨ B) and U(B) are going to agree, on this formula, if as we’re contemplating pr(B
$1,000,000) = pr((B⋆∨B) $1,000,000) = 1.
Reply 3: The objection assumes that it is up to the agent whether she eats only regular apples or
also b. But the line between what’s under Bina’s control and what’s left to chance can be drawn how
we like. Imagine it goes like this: when Bina shows up with her basket, a chance mechanism half
the time throws b in, where it mixes undetectably with the other apples. What is in Bina’s control
is whether to . But supposing she does, whether it is ∧Eb that obtains (Eb is eating badapple),
or ∧¬Eb, is decided quite independently (pr(Eb) = pr(Eb | ) = 1/2). Castaneda draws attention to
this kind of choice structure in the paper already mentioned. One
can bring about ... P∨Q either by bringing about P directly, or by bringing about Q
directly, or by [activating] a process that will end up either with the realization of P or
with the realization of P. (Castañeda [1969], 263)
P in our case is ∧Eb, andQ is ∧¬Eb. Bina can bring about their disjunction, but which disjunct
obtains is decided by chance.
With the case filled out liked this, our earlier contention that B⋆ ≻ B is clearly correct, for B⋆
always brings in $1,000,000, while in B-worlds we get oftentimes much less, depending on the out-
come of a chance process. Castaneda’s Principle takes us from B⋆ ≻ B to B⋆∨B ≻ B as before —
from which it is a short step by congruence to A ≻ B.10
9.4 Control Issues
The chancy version of GAB is underdescribed. Is it only if Bina chooses B that she lacks control overwhether b is eaten? Or does she lack it as well if she chooses A? Either way a problem arises.
Say it is only the B-chooser who loses control over b’s fate. Then it is not true after all that the
same worlds are in play however Bina chooses. One choice (A) leaves her able to eat b, the other
(B) deprives her of that ability. But the purported counterexample to intensionalism requires Bina to
have the same possible futures before her, apple-selection-wise, whatever she decides.
If the chance mechanism takes control from the A-chooser too, then A’s supposed advantage over
B—done right, it wins you $1,000,000— evaporates. Whether A is done right is no more under the
A-chooser’s control than which kind of B-world she ends up in is under the B-chooser’s control.
Now we see how the argument at the end of section 8 misfires. Castaneda’s Principle needs
to be understood a certain way. X ≻ Y does not ensure X∨Y ≻ Y unless the agent is able to take
advantage of the opportunity X∨Y presents — by steering events towards the ways of X∨Y-ing that
confer on X its advantage over Y. But if the agent is able to steer events in the proper direction, then
Castaneda’s Principle fails in another way. It no longer follows from X ≻ Y that X ≻ X∨Y since the
agent will exercise the X∨Y option by X-ing. This destroys the argument since it starts with precisely
10For the first step we need that B⋆∨B ≇ B. How is this established? Take any  you like, ∧Eb is a way for B⋆ to hold,
and hence a way for B⋆∨B to hold. But although ∧Eb is true in some nearby B-worlds, it is not a way for B to hold, given
the irrelevance to B of whether badapple is eaten.
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this inference: B⋆ ≻ B⋆ (line [1]) is taken to imply B⋆ ≻ (B⋆ ∨ B⋆) (line [2]). Assuming completecontrol, the B⋆ sub-option, which brings in only a penny, will never be exercised. If B⋆ is neverexercised, it would be better surely to say that B⋆ ≈ (B⋆ ∨ B⋆).
Reply 4 The X ≻ Y ⇒ X∨Y ≻ Y side of Castaneda’s Principle is acceptable, you’re saying, only
if it is up to the agent how the relevant options are exercised, that is, which of the possible ways
of X-ing, Y-ing, etc are enacted. If it is up to the agent, though, then the other side of Castaneda’s
Principle — X ≻ Y ⇒ X ≻ X∨Y fails, in a way that directly undercuts the section 8 argument.
But, the X ≻ Y ⇒ X∨Y ≻ Y sub-principle assumes at most that the agent has some control (it’s
enough, really, that X-ing could occur, through the agent’s efforts or not). While the objection to X
≻ Y ⇒ X ≻ X∨Y assumes that the agent has complete control and will never Y given that X is better.
This is hardly a vice like grip we’re caught in. It is not all that embarrassing if CAP applies, and the
argument for A ≻ B goes through, only when X is neither precluded nor guaranteed.
The issue this objection really raises is how to square our hyperintensionality-favoring con-
tentions about qualitative preferability with the practice of quantitative decision theory, taken almost
universally to be an intensional theory that wants no truck with fine-grained distinctions. How can A
can be preferable to B, when — given that the eat-almost-all-apples-distinct from b-chooser would
eat b too, “on the side” as it were — the expected utilities agree? An excellent question which we
begin to grapple with (grappling is all we’ll manage unfortunately) now.
10 Expected Utility
Our principal claim: A is a better option thanB, notwithstanding the fact thatA andB are intensionally
equivalent. In support of this we offered a kind of ways-based dominance argument (section 8).
That argument may seem far from decisive, relying as it does on assumptions like Hyperequivalent
Congruence
(HYC) if X ≅ Y, then X ≈ Y.
and Castaneda’s Principle
(CAP) If X ≻ Y, then X∨Y ≻ Y11 and X ≻ X∨Y12
These are comparative principles. And as we know, qualitative and comparative principles have
come in for much less discussion than the quantitative principles studied in causal decision theory,
e.g.,
(UCP) X ≻ Y iff
U(X) (= ΣO pr(X O) × V(O)) > U(Y) (= ΣO pr(Y O) × V(O)).
(12)
If A≻ B as claimed, then U(A) ought other things equal to be greater than U(B). And now we run into
trouble. A can come out with a higher expected utility than B only if AO differs in probability
from BO for some outcomes O. This will be difficult to arrange on standard, Lewis-Stalnaker
type, theories of counterfactuals.
The reason is that X’s contribution on standard theories to the proposition expressed by XY
in a world is the set f(w, X) of near-enough worlds where X is true. This set does not change if we
substitute an X′ intensionally equivalent to X. But then AO comes out expressing the same set-of-
worlds proposition as BO. Which makes it hard to see how the two counterfactuals can differ in
probability or hence how U(A) can exceed U(B). A’s presumed superiority over B comes into conflict
with the fact, if it is one, that U(A) ≯ U(B).
11Assuming X∨Y ≇ Y.
12Assuming X∨Y ≇ X.
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I say “if it is one” because the case just made for U(A) ≯ U(B) is not air-tight, for reasons we
now begin looking into. A and B obtain, recall, in highly specific ways, indicated above with s and
s. Suppose that the apples are a1, a2, etc., with badapple coming first (b = a1). Then A’s ways ofholding (the ⋆s and ⋆s) are representable as assignments to each natural number n of ✓ (if an isto be eaten) or 7 (if an is not to be eaten). The s come out looking like this:
a1 a2 a3 a4 a5 ....
1⋆ 7 3 3 3 ....
⋆1 3 3 3 3 ....
2⋆ 7 7 3 3 ....
⋆2 3 7 3 3 ....
3⋆ 7 3 7 3 ....
⋆3 3 3 7 3 ....
4⋆ 7 7 7 3 ....
⋆4 3 7 7 3 ........ ... ... ... ... ....
n⋆ 7 ... ... ... ....
⋆n 3 ... ... ... ........ ... ... ... ... ....
Table 3: Ways for A to hold
The s resemble the ⋆s, except that b (= a1) is out of the picture; it is not a fruit that even canfigure in ways of eating almost all apples ≠ b:
a1 a2 a3 a4 a5 ....
(1) — 3 3 3 3 ...
(2) — 7 3 3 3 ....
(3) — 3 7 3 3 ...
(4) — 7 7 3 3 ...
(5) — 3 3 7 3 ...
(6) — 7 3 7 3 ...
(7) — 3 7 7 3 ...
(8) — 7 7 7 3 ...
.... — ... ... ... .... ....
(n) — ... ... ... ... ....
.... — ... ... ... ... ....
Table 4: Ways for B to hold
That A and B have such varied possible implementations suggests that they are “underlyingly”
disjunctive, even if not disjunctive on the surface. This is important since disjunctiveness turns out to
complicate matters when it comes to decision-theoretic calculations. What is pr(A O) supposed
even to mean, when different s have different probabilities of producing a given outcome?13
13The title of the next section is a play on Kratzer’s “How Specific is a Fact?” which strikes similar themes (Kratzer [1990]).
See also Kratzer [1989] and Kratzer [2002].
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11 How Specific is an Act?
The probability of  O is likely to differ from that of ′ O. This is one of the reasons that
Lewis elects, in his own version of causal decision theory, to make acts/options A as specific as
possible — subject to a certain condition, that which option is realized is under the agent’s control.
Suppose we have a partition of propositions that distinguish worlds where the agent acts
differently .... Further, he can act at will so as to make any one of these propositions
hold; but he cannot act at will so as to make any proposition hold that implies but is not
implied by (is properly included in) a proposition in the partition. The partition gives the
most detailed specifications of his present action over which he has control. Then this
is the partition of the agents’ alternative options. Say that the agent realises an option iff
he acts in such a way as to make it hold. Then the business of decision theory is to say
which of the agent’s alternative options it would be rational for him to realise. (Lewis
[1981], 7)
He adds in a footnote that “They are his narrowest options. Any proposition implied by one of
them might be called an option for him in a broader sense, since he could act at will so as to make
it hold. But when I speak of options, I shall always mean the narrowest options.” Reserving  for
narrowest — henceforth simply “narrow” — options, X is an option in Lewis’s broad sense (it’s a
broadL option) iff it is implied by some .Broad options will have to be accommodated somehow. I am not normally deciding between
options so specific as to exhaust what I have control over. But Lewis’s sense is too broad to be
useful. An agent can act so as to make a broadL option X hold, but not normally so as to make X fail.
X = Someone blinks is a broadL option, since it’s implied by I blink, and hence by any narrow option
 that has me blinking. But decision theory should not be offering me advice about whether to see
to it that someone blinks as opposed to no one blinking Which of these obtains is not up to me; for I
cannot bring it about that no one blinks.
Is there no way to restrict the term “broad option” to Xs such that it is under my control whether
or not X obtains? There is. Call X broad if it is a disjunction of narrow options , e.g., X might be
1∨2. Whether 1∨2 holds is under my control for I can bring it about that it does hold, and thatI can bring it about that it doesn’t. I do the first by 1-ing, or else by 2-ing. I do the second bydeclining both to 1 and to 2.This does not get us all the way out of the woods, however. Yes, broad options construed as
disjunctions of s are within my power to enact or not, as I choose. But how is that choice supposed to
be made? You might think it should be on the basis of the options’ expected utilities. But to calculate
the expected utility of a disjunction 1∨2, we will need to know for each outcome O the probabilityof ((1∨2) O. And there is not much agreement these days about how to evaluate, much lesscalculate the probabilities of, counterfactuals with disjunctive antecedents. Fans of Simplification
(SDA) (P∨Q) R ⊨ (P R) ∧ (Q R) (13)
would seem committed to
(PDA) pr((1∨2) O) ≤ min(pr(1 O), pr(2 O)) (14)
To go by (PDA), pr((1∨2) O) ought to be zero when 1’s potential outcomes are differentenough from 2’s. Suppose for instance that pr(1 O1) = 1 and pr(2 O2) = 1, where O1 and
O2 are incompatible. Then pr((1∨2) O1) is zero (since it is bounded above by pr(2 O1) =0) and pr((1∨2) O2) is 0 (since it is bounded above by pr(1 O2) = 0).Perhaps then we should consider 1 and 2’s possible outcomes separately, factoring in only laterthe probability of (1∨2)-ing the one way as opposed to the other. The utility of 1∨2 on this view
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is the average value of 1’s possible outcomes and 2’s, weighted by (i) the probability the agent will
1∨2 by i-ing, and (ii) the probability that i-ing (2-ing) will result in O:
U(1∨2) = Σi=1,2 pr(i | 1∨2) × ΣO (pr(i O) × V(O)). (15)
Assuming as before that ΣO pr(iO) ×V(O) is U(i), this comes close to a formula proposedlong ago by Jeffrey:14
U(1∨2) = Σi=1,2 pr(i | 1∨2) × U(i). (16)
.
But now, howwill the agent divide her credence (conditional on their disjunction) between 1 and
2? Suppose to keep things simple that she expects herself to go forwhichever of the two is rationally
preferable, that is, whichever has the higher expected utility. This is fair enough but it leaves broad
options with no real work to do. Even when officially the choice is between broad options, say, 1∨2and 3∨4, the decision process bottoms out at narrow options i, Why not follow Lewis in that caseand run our calculations on 1, 2, 3, and 4 right from the start?This does not do away with disjunctive options, exactly, but it does leave them very much on
the sidelines; they come out exactly as valuable as their best disjunct. Deciding between 1∨2and 3∨4 turns out to be “really” a matter of deciding among the four is, then checking which of
1∨2, 3∨4 has the winning i as a disjunct. In effect the decision-maker is portrayed as adopting amaximax rule. The question from her perspective is, what’s the best that could happen. Eating cake
is no better an option than eating cake or poison, given that the agent exercises the latter option by
eating cake. That is not how we ordinarily think of it and not how the decision theorist should think
of it. A theory that does not recommend cake over cake-or-poison has no business advertising itself
as a theory of rational choice.
12 Interventionism
Another, more recent, approach to the problem of disjunctive options gets its probabilities from a
Pearl-style system of structural equations. One starts with a “causal model” ℳ built on variables
X, Y, Z, etc. laid out in a directed graph. Z’s value is fixed by its parents’ values according to the
model’s governing equations, e.g., Z := X ∨ Y. (The values of X and Y derive analogously from their
own parents’ values, until we reach “exogenous” variables whose values are given outright.) To
evaluate, say, (¬X ∧ ¬Y) ¬Z, we plug 0 in for X and for Y (thus verifying the antecedent) and
check whether the the resulting value for ¬Z is 1. Indeed it is (Z = (0 ∨ 0) = 0). So the counterfactual
is reckoned true.
This works well for counterfactuals — like (¬X ∧ ¬Y) ¬Z — with conjunctive antecedents.
But to calculate expected utilities for options like eating cofinitely many apples, we will need to
assign probabilities to counterfactuals with disjunctive antecedents. Ray Briggs in an important
paper observes that the interventionist has no obvious way even of evaluating such counterfactuals:
The most striking difference between the similarity and causal modeling accounts is that
the similarity account does, and existing causal modeling accounts do not, allow us to
assign truth values to arbitrary counterfactuals. Galles and Pearl consider a language in
which the only expressible counterfactuals have the form
P1 ∧ ... ∧ Pn Q1 ∧ .... ∧ Qm,
where P1,...., Pn and Q1,...., Qm are atomic (Briggs [2012], 147).15
14Albeit Jeffrey was talking, as an evidential decision theorist, about expected value rather than expected utility.
15Think of the Pis as assigning numerical values to n distinct variables, while the Qjs assign values to m variables causallydownstream from these.
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How are we to extend the theory to disjunctive counterfactuals like (¬X ∨ ¬Y) ¬Z—- equiv-
alently to (P1 ∨ P2)Q3, where the Pis assign 0 to X and Y, andQ3 assigns 0 to Z? (E.g., we mightin the two-button case want to evaluate If the left-hand button hadn’t been pressed, or the right-hand
button hadn’t been pressed, the light would have stayed off.)
Suppose following Briggs that we let the world role by played by saturated causal models—made
up of graphs, equations, and assignments of numbers to variables. If both buttons were pressed in
fact (L=R=1), then the closest world where Lefty isn’t pressed is the tweaked model where L is set
to 0, R is left at 1, and other values are assigned according to the equations; so ¬L $0.16 What
then about (¬L∨¬R) $0?
The suggestion is to think about this, like Stalnaker, in selection-function terms: f(w, ') contains
the '-worlds that have got to be  , for '  to hold in w. The question is, what should f(w, '1 ∨
'2) be? If we want (¬L∨¬R) ¬$1,000,000 to mean, as it should, that we get $1,000,000 only ifboth buttons are pressed — much less if any buttons are left unpressed — then f(w, '1 ∨ '2) shouldbe f(w, '1) ∪ f(w, '2).Briggs’ union rule has the result that the worlds that have to be $0 for (¬L∨ ¬R) $0 to hold
are the ones that have to be $0 for ¬R $0 to hold, and the ones that have to be worthless for ¬R
 ¬$1,000,000 to hold. (¬L∨¬R) $.01 winds up entailing (¬L∧R) $.01, (L∧¬R) $.01,
and (¬L ∧ ¬R) $.01, since f(w, ¬L∨¬R) = f(w, ¬L) ∪ f(w, ¬R), subsumes each of f(w, ¬L), f(w,
¬R), and f(w, ¬L∧¬R) (= f(w, ¬L) ∩ f(w, ¬R)).17
Suppose quite generally that f(w, X) is obtained by unioning f(w, ) as  ranges over X’s possible
truthmakers, what we have called its ways of being true. Since logical equivalents can differ in
their truthmakers (they need not be hyper-equivalent), they will not always be substitutable in the
antecedents of counterfactuals. Briggs puts it like this:
The concept of truthmaking generates a sense of equivalence which is narrower than
the ordinary classical one, and which I will call exact equivalence, following Fine. Two
sentences are exact equivalents [hyper-equivalents, in our terminology] iff they have the
same truthmakers. Not every pair of classically equivalent sentences is exactly equiva-
lent; for instance, (¬X ∧ Y) ∨ (¬X ∧ ¬Y)) is classically, but not exactly, equivalent to X.
Although exact equivalents can be freely substituted in the antecedents of counterfactu-
als, classical equivalents cannot. (155)
Take again the two switch case, with the twist that we win $1,000,000, if either button is pushed.
If the first hadn’t been pushed (¬L), we would still have got rich. But it’s false that we would still
have got rich if: either the first hadn’t been pushed or neither had been pushed ¬L ∨ (¬L∧¬R)), since
the light would have been off it neither had been pushed. And yet ¬L ∨ (¬L∧¬R)) holds in the same
worlds as ¬L.
The upshot is that it is not true, on intervenist theories of counterfactuals, that “X’s contribution
to the proposition expressed by XY in a world is just the set of nearby worlds where X is true.” Of
course that set of worlds is “the same for any X′ intensionally equivalent to X.” But antecedents are
often thought nowadays to contribute something more fine-grained than a single set of worlds—a set
of truthmakers, perhaps, or a set of alternatives, or a set of sets of worlds.18
For a couple of reasons, then, the argument in section 10 from the “intensionality of counter-
factuals” to the intensionality of utility does not succeed in showing that A ⊁ B. The first is that
counterfactuals are often thought nowadays to be hyperintensional. And even if they are intensional,
expected utility may not be. The utility of a disjunction of acts derives, one may think, from the
16Think of $0 here as covering the case where you get a penny and the case where you get nothing.
17This may or may not be the result we ultimately want. For further subtleties see Ciardelli et al. [2018], Lassiter [2017],
and Lassiter [2018].
18There is a large literature on these matters and I’m no expert. See among others Fine [2012], Santorio [2018], Khoo
[2018], and Santorio [2021]. Briggs’ theory is akin in some ways to what Fine proposes. For Pearl’s own take on disjunctive
actions, see Pearl [2017].
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utilities of the acts taken one by one. And intensional equivalents are liable to differ in their disjuncts
(e.g., XY ∨ XȲ unlike X has XY as a disjunct, and unlike X can be done by XY-ing).
13 By-Ways
How do the worldly and wayward approaches to decision-making relate, and how do we decide
between them? A good place to start is with Jeffrey, because although a world-theorist he falls at
times into the language of ways.
In section 8 we attributed to Jeffrey the idea that an unspecific option R’s value goes with the
average value of its realizations Ri, weighted by their probabilities conditional on R. The Stanford
Encyclopedia of Philosophy explains it like this:
the desirability of a proposition, including one representing acts, depends both on the
desirabilities of the different ways in which the proposition can be true, and the relative
probability that it is true in these respective ways... Let {R1, R2, ..., Rn} be one amongstmany finite partitions of the proposition R; that is, sets of mutually incompatible but
jointly exhaustive ways in which the proposition R can be realised... The desirability of
R according to Jeffrey, denoted Des(R), is given by:
Jeffreys’ Equation Des(R) = Σi Des(Ri) × pr(Ri∕R) (17)
A question may have occurred to you. Doesn’t it make Jeffreys’ Equation circular that to deter-
mine P’s desirability, one must already know the desirability of its realizations Pi? Of course onecan try to apply it again to the Pi realizations Pij , but this gets us no further ahead since the problemarises again for them.
Howmuch this should bother us depends onwhether the problem keeps on arising forever. Jeffrey
would say that it doesn’t. The process bottoms out at P’s maximally specific realizations: the worlds
W that verify P. Worlds are not multiply realizable, making them the perfect place for the P, Pi, Pij ,
Pijk ,...sequence to come to a halt.
It is only the complete consistent novels that can be said to have nonprobabilistic values:
the desirability of a proposition will be a probability-weighted average of the values of
the possible worlds in which it would be true (Jeffrey [1990], 209).
Assuming the number of worlds is finite (otherwise we have to integrate), Jeffreys’ equation boils
down to something totally well-defined:
Des(R) = ΣW Des(W) × pr(W/R) (18)
But, if worlds for Jeffrey are ways (the ultimate ways, no less), then his relation to (16) —
U(1∨2) = Σi=1,2 pr(i | 1∨2) ×U(i) — needs to be reconsidered. The idea in (10) is not that
R’s utility can be obtained by subdividing the R-worlds however you like.19 It’s that we can obtain
the utility of a a disjunction of narrow options by subdividing its worlds into the ones verifying the
first disjunct, the ones verifying the second, and so on.
This is all somewhat obscured by the fact that Jeffrey speaks as we do of “ways for R to be true.”
What he has in mind by ways for R to hold is importantly different from what we’ve meant by the
phrase in this paper. R’s ways of being true for us are R’s potential truthmakers— the facts by virtue
of which R is, or could be, true. These facts correspond in the case of option-statements like Bina
19This way lies “partition invariance.”
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eats an apple to the more specific acts by doing which Bina could exercise the option, e.g., eating
this apple in particular. The FIRST LAW OF WAYS, as we’re conceiving them here, is that
(FLW)  counts as a way for R to hold only if one R’s by -ing —
or, in the case of non-action sentences, the world R’s (verifies R) by -ing. (19)
Let’s call this, Ii you can forgive the cuteness, the BY-LAW. Ways of the type it governs will be
BY-WAYS, though often we’ll just say WAYS.
How do WAYS related to the ways (henceforth ways) that Jeffrey is interested in? R’s ways of
being true are the members Ri of any old partition of the set of R-worlds— any old set of propositionsthat are mutually incompatible and jointly exhaustive of those worlds. It is clear from the Stanford
Encyclopedia piece quoted above that Ri need have nothing to do with how or why R obtains. Thepassage continues
if P is the proposition that it is raining, then we could partition this proposition ... ac-
cording to whether we go to the beach or not.
As we ordinarily think of it, It’s raining is not true for different reasons, or in virtue of different
facts, according to whether we go (or not) to the beach. Raining-and-beach-going is a way Pi for itto rain, relative to the right partition, but it is not a way i for it to rain. Going in the other direction,it makes no difference to whyWe went to the beach is true that that it rains (or doesn’t) when we get
there. Beach-going-followed-by-rain is a way of going to the beach, but it is not a way of going, any
more than being rained on while dancing is a way of dancing.
Where does this leave us? The crucial point about ways is that they lump an act’s concomitants
(including, notably, its aftermath) in with how the act gets performed in the first place. Jeffrey is
slightly confusing on this, since a lot of his examples involve WAYS:
The agent is trying to comfort a lady whose cat has been killed. This may consist in
any of a variety of acts, such as giving her another cat, holding her hand, or saying “He
was getting old and stiff, anyway.” And there are many ways of performing the last-
mentioned act, of saying the words, some of which would be more likely to produce
comfort than others: variations in volume of voice, proximity of speaker to hearer, and
facial expression might all be important. (Jeffrey [1990], 178)
But although WAYS do motivational work for Jeffrey, they have no special role to play in the
theory. Ri still counts as a way for R to hold, even when it is obtained from R by tacking on as aconjunct a randomly chosen other proposition S. “When a proposition can come true in more than
one way [way!], it is, in effect, a gamble...” (87). A gamble on what? One is gambling, in picking R
over ¬R, that cases of R—propositions partitioning the R-worlds — are on (weighted) average better
than cases of ¬R—propositions partitioning the ¬R-worlds.
any analysis into mutually exclusive, collectively exhaustive cases can be refined by
taking a further proposition into account. Relative to a single proposition R, the cases
are R, R̄. But nothing prevents us from making use of the fact that each of these cases
can in turn be split into two: R becomes two cases,
RS, RS̄
and R̄ becomes two cases,
R̄S, R̄S̄.
And each of these four cases can in turn be split into two by considering a third propo-
sition, T, etc. Then the distinction between propositions that can be true in only one
way and [the rest] is relative to the number of cases that we see fit to consider. (Jeffrey
[1990], 87)
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An agent does not bring it about that R by bringing it about that RS, or bringing it about that RS̄.
So Jeffrey can only be talking here about ways.
14 Finesse
Not every distinction worth remarking on is worth jumping up and down about. Some distinctions,
real though they may be, are better finessed. Wouldn’t it be simpler, other things equal, to run all
ways together, as Jeffrey does, lumping WAYS of R-ing in with ways, things like R-ing within five
miles of a burning barn or R-ing followed by applause?
Lewis evidently thought that other things weren’t equal. He wanted to limit ways of doing a
thing to the finest-grained options  such that it’s up to the agent which is enacted. He did not
disagree with Jeffrey about  being itself a gamble — better or worse according to how likely it is to
lead, in the circumstances, to good results. The question is what is allowed to go into the possible
“circumstances” over which one distributes credences en route to deciding how to act. Lewis wants
to limit them to facts outside the agent’s control. Jeffrey models decision-makers as having views
also facts within their control, e.g., what they are about to do.
Some object to this on the basis that overconfidence about what I am going to do can undermine
the calculations that recommend it as the best thing to do.20 Some like Levi maintain that “delibera-
tion crowds out prediction.”21 Some worry that deliberation gets itself tangled up in feedback loops
if the choice between i and j depends on a prior estimate of the likelihood of choosing i (j).22All of these are, or could be, reasons for setting WAYS — how one accomplishes a thing — apart
from ways—states of the world might wherein the thing is done. Feedback loops in particular come
in for a lot of discussion in recent years, by people who (unlike me) have ideas about them.23 I want
consider a different reason, closer to our present concerns.
Among the ways of B-ing — of eating all but finitely many apples ≠ b — are some, like ∀ =eating all the apples, where I eat b as well. ! is NOT, by contrast, a WAY of B-ing. This again is
because eating b plays no part in its coming about that you B, that is, eat almost all apples distinct
from b. Of course eating b is compatible with B-ing; but that is a far cry from being done potentially
in the act of B-ing.
What was said here of ∀ applies as well to all the s that get you rich. They are compatible with
B-ing, but they are not the sort of thing that B-ers do as such. They are not done in the act of B-ing,
but only that of A-ing. Now, which of these sounds like a stronger point in favor of X-ing — that it
doesn’t rule out getting rich, or that you can get rich precisely by X-ing, i.e., by doing what you do to
X? The second, surely. That X doesn’t preclude good outcomes hardly seems like a recommendation
at all, unless the competition does preclude them. I suppose some kind of homage is paid to blinking,
when you remark that it’s over so quickly that there is still time to pursue one’s dreams. But it’s the
damning with faint praise kind. There is nothing faint about the praise it pays X-ing to say that it can
be done, at one’s discretion, in a dream-fulfilling way.
Finessing the way/WAY distinction costs us something option-assessment-wise. It would be one
thing if good ways of doing a thing reflected as well on it as good ways of doing it (good s by which
one can X). But this does not seem to be the case. Certainly it is not the case where other normative
notions are involved. Lying is not made more permissible by the fact that there are worlds where you
lie harmlessly, say, because no one hears you. It does not say much for the rationality of believing
the first thing anyone tells you that there are good ways of doing it, e.g., the way it’s done in worlds
where the first thing you’re told is deeply, profoundly true.
But let’s return to a case from the last paragraph. Blinking is not made much advisable, we said,
by the fact you can eat all the apples (earning thereby $1,000,000) after you’re done. Why should it
20See Jeffrey [1990], ch11, and Jeffrey [1977].
21Joyce [2002]
22Skyrms [1990].
23Egan [2007], Arntzenius [2008], Joyce [2012], Spencer [2021].
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make B-ing— eating almost all apples≠ b—advisable that you can eat bwhen you’re done (earning
thereby the same amount)?
Here is why, you might say: to win $1,000,000, you must at least B. B-ing is necessary, albeit
not sufficient, for winning the million. And indeed every lucrative way of A-ing has a way of B-ing
as a part. But again, the choice we face is not between B-ing and blinking, it’s between B-ing and
A-ing. That each  gets us part of the way to the jackpot does favor B over burping. But does it boost
B’s standing vis-a-vis A-ing? That it gets us part of the way to $1,000,000, even an essential part of
the way, is a plus for B. But it can hardly bring B up to A’s level; for A-ing gets us (can get us) all the
way to $1,000,000. Alternatively we can put it in dominance terms Every other way of A-ing makes
you rich. NO ways of B-ing make you rich. This seems a strong point in favor of A-ing.
Decision theory ranks options on the score of rational preferability, and advises us to act in accord
with the ones that are highest-ranked. What is it to act “in accord with” X? Orthodox decision theory,
when it recommends X, is steering us towards acts consistent with X. X is preferable to Y if acts
consistent with X lead on balance to better results than acts consistent with Y. The approach explored
here ranks options based on how they are liable be exercised. X is preferable to Y if to X leads
on balance, averaging over the ways  of X-ing, to better results than Y-ing does. The point of
recommending X over Y is to steer us, not towards acts consistent with X, but towards ways of X-ing
— towards the acts by performing which one Xs. I take it that the second approach is more in line
with ordinary notions of advice and advisability.
To see why, consider again the two button example, the version where both buttons must be
pressed to turn the light on and win the big reward. Neither button is down to begin with. Among
our options are (i) pressing the left button (L), and (ii) either pressing both buttons, or pressing just
the one on the left (LR∨LR̄). (ii) may strike us as the better option, since to LR (the jackpot-winner)
is a way of (LR∨LR̄)-ing, but not of L-ing. LR is not precluded by L; it is even partly accomplished
by L-ing (albeit no more than LR̄-ing is partly accomplished by L-ing). (ii) is better than (i), on the
hyperintensional approach, for just this reason.
How do the options compare from an intensionalist perspective? If not precluding renumerative
behavior is the best an option can hope for, then fact is that L achieves this just as well as LR ∨ LR̄.
L∨L̄ and L∨R̄ do not for that matter preclude getting rich either. They are just as good, then, from
a Jeffreyian perspective as LR, assuming as seems reasonable that the agent’s way of L∨R̄-ing is to
LR.
“Choose this, as it will (done right) win you $1,000,000” is by ordinary standards better advice
than “Choose that, as it doesn’t stop you from winning $1,000,000.” Hyperintensionalism gives the
first, this-done-right-will-make-you-rich sort of advice. Intensionalism’s advice takes the second
form: this does not definitely make you poor. Insofar as the first sort of advice is more useful,
hyperintensionalism does a better job of pinning down what is (was) to be done than its traditional
rival intensionalism.
15 Intensional about Evidence
All kinds of propositions can stand in preference relations and be assessed for desirability. The ones
that function in Jeffrey as options — those to the effect that an agent does, or tries to do, thus and
such — are special only from the perspective of the agent, when she is deciding whether to do thus
and such, and/or the rest of us when we are evaluating her decision. Propositions play a doxastic
role too, obviously, as objects of belief and credence. And they function epistemically as pieces of
evidence, and hypotheses potentially confirmed by that evidence. If intensional equivalents can differ
as options, then it stands to reason that they might differ too as pieces of evidence, or as conjectures
that a given body of evidence may (or may not) support.
An infinitary example will be given in a minute. But let’s first consider something simpler. Sup-
pose that P and Q are evidentially quite independent; neither supports the other. To learn that P —
the penny came up heads – - would not change your views about Q— the quarter came up heads —
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in the slightest. But, what if you learned instead that P∨Q (one coin or the other came up heads), or,
to make the alternative evidence intensionally equivalent to P, that either the penny came up heads
or it and t he quarter both came up heads?
This might well change your attitude about the quarter. There is a decent chance after all that
P∨PQ holds thanks to the fact thatPQ, hence thanks in part to the fact of the quarter coming up heads.
Granted, the news that P∨PQmay be uninformative about the quarter. Imagine our informant Smyth
has evidence only for P; the second disjunct (PQ) is tacked on for no good reason later. Smyth would
resemble in that case Gettier’s Smith, who starting out with the justified false believe that Jones owns
a Ford, arrives at Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona by “select[ing] three place-names quite
at random,”
construct[ing] the following three propositions:
• Either Jones owns a Ford, or Brown is in Boston;
• Either Jones owns a Ford, or Brown is in Barcelona;
• Either Jones owns a Ford, or Brown is in Brest-Litovsk.
and adopting all three as further beliefs. Smyth’s testimony carries no information about the quarter
if she observed only the penny and arrived at The penny came up heads and the quarter did by
selecting three coins quite at random and adopting as further beliefs
• Either the penny came up heads or the penny and the nickel did;
• Either the penny came up heads or the penny and the quarter did;
• Either the penny came up heads or the penny and the dime did
But the bare possibility of P∨PQ carrying no information aboutQ doesn’t count for much. To ignore
the second disjunct, one would have to be certain of it. Perhaps Smyth’s own informant testified
either that the penny came up heads, or that it and the quarter both did (the bar was noisy and Smyth
couldn’t be sure). Smyth might have heard that the penny and quarter both came up heads and that
seems like enough for evidential relevance vis a vis the quarter.24
16 Consistency and Confirmation
You may object that E’s evidential value depends only on what it’s consistent with, e.g., Bayesians
think it’s a function of which worlds E is consistent with. This is the same obviously for P and P∨PQ.
People do often say, “it’s consistent with our evidence that the dog was hungry,” as if this meant our
evidence supported the hunger hypothesis.
But “it’s consistent with our evidence that the dog was hungry” is at the same time a strange
thing to say. E does not make much of a case for H, if the best one can claim for it is consistency
with E. Imagine our evidence consists of facts about the Battle of Hastings, e.g., that it occurred in
1066. This is consistent with the hungry-dog hypothesis, but it hardly supports that hypothesis.
Perhaps what people mean when they say “it’s consistent with our evidence that H” is that E
is more consistent with H than with ¬H (pr(H|E) > pr(¬H|E). This does not offer H much support
either though, unless a serious and continuing effort is being made to gather H-relevant evidence.
(As often it has, when people say this kind of thing.)
The claim might be that H remains more consistent with our evidence than ¬H — or becomes
increasingly consistent withE relative to¬H—themoreH-relevant evidencewe gather. The stronger
E gets, the more the EH-worlds outnumber/outweigh EH̄-worlds.
24There are issues here about conditioning on all one learns, including facts about the causal provenance of one’s evidence
conceived more narrowly. More on this later hopefully.
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This is not going to move us all by itself, though, for a body of evidence can be expanded along
prejudicial lines. Who is to say that the speaker has not adopted a policy of beating about in H-
friendly bushes, to the exclusion neighboring bushes where H-disfavoring evidence might lurk?25
To address this one needs presumably to consider counterfactuals of the form
• If H, evidence for it would be found in these bushes
• If ¬H, evidence for it would be found in those bushes
• If E, we would encounter the fact that E in H-favoring bushes.
• If E obtained, we would encounter the fact that E in H-disfavoring bushes.
But these counterfactuals are arguably themselves hyperintensional, for reasons of a sort already
seen. If Hamlet’s author was a literary genius, it would say so in a book arguing that the same
man wrote Hamlet and Novum Organum seems not terribly probable — much less probable than If
Hamlet’s author was a literary genius, e.g., the literary genius Francis Bacon, it would say so in a
book arguing that the same man wrote Hamlet and Novum Organum.
A similar dynamic is at work with the two hypotheses in APPLES: A = Eve has eaten almost all of
the apples, B = She has eaten almost all of the apples distinct from b. Imagine that someone walks in
with the news E that Eve has eaten badapple. We know that Eve decides, for each apple ai, whetherto eat it by flipping a fair coin — a different coin for each apple. This being so it tells us nothing
about which apples she’s eaten apart from b that Eve has eaten b. B is not confirmed in the slightest
by evidence E.
This is just what we’d expect of course. What does seem a bit surprising is a result that follows
from E not confirming B, if confirmation is intensional on the right hand side. A and B are cointen-
sional; so, if confirmation is intensional on the right hand side, E does not count in favor of A either.
Eve’s eating b smiles no more on her eating a lot of apples of which b is one, than on her eating a lot
of b-distinct apples.
But now, how could it not be good news for the hypothesis that most 's are  s that this ' is  ?
Would it not have been worse news for the hypothesis, had it turned out not to be  ? When E is better
news for a hypothesis than ¬E, we usually do not hesitate to call it good news for that hypothesis,
granted that the goodness may be slight or unquantifiable.
“E is better news for A than ¬E would be” is meant to express a comparative judgment, like
the judgment that R ≻ S. I am not suggesting that pr(A|E) >pr(B|¬E); the conditional probabilities
may be equal, or ill-defined. The suggestion is just that (in a hopefully obvious notation from qual-
itative/comparative probability theory), A|E ≻ A|⊤ ≻ A|¬E — notwithstanding the existence of an
intensionally equivalent B such that B|E ⊁ B|⊤ ⊁ B|¬E.26
17 Hyperintensionalism about Evidence
This is only intuition-pumping, you may say. What is the argument supposed to be? I am not sure I
have one. But here are some relevant-seeming considerations.
Homogeneity Supplementing Eve eats b with sufficiently many other facts of the same form (Eve
eats ai) does give us evidence for Eve eats almost all the apples (A). Indeed enough such facts entail
Eve ate almost all the apples, given that the apples are the ais. But one fact of the form Eve eats ai
25Salow [2018]
26On comparative probabilities, see Walley and Fine [1979], Fishburn [1986], Hawthorne et al. [2016], Ding et al. [2021].
(None of this literature embraces hyperintensionality to my knowledge.)
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form carries no more weight than another! If Eve eats b were not relevant, it is hard to see how it
plus a bunch of no-more-relevant facts could provide decisive support for A.27
Analogy That Eve eats b does count in favor of Eve’s eating all the apples, if only in the dodged-
a-bullet sense; the hypothesis is refuted if she doesn’t eat b. It counts too obviously in favor of her
eating some of the apples, or at least n of the apples, or within n of all the apples. How can E support
these hypotheses but not A, though all are to the effect that there at least so many, or thus and such a
proportion of, 's are  s?
Polarity Logicians have the notion of an atom p occurring positively in complex formula '. p occurs
positively in p∧q, p∨q, and q⊃p; negatively in ¬p and p⊃q; and neither positively nor negatively in
p≡q. The notion is defined syntactically, but it has in finitary languages a clearly semantic upshot:
toggling p to true can make ' true but never false. This result does not for perhaps guessable reasons
extend to infinitary languages.28 But it still holds “in spirit”; the truth oof positively occurring sub-
formulas of ' bears in a clear intuitive sense favorably on '.29 Now, Eve eats b occurs positively in
the obvious propositional rendering of Eve eats almost all the apples. E to that extent bears favorably
on A.30
Overdetermination One way to establish Eve eats b’s relevance would be to show that it figured in
a minimal truthmaker — a fact making A such that no weaker fact makes A. This will not be possible
since A has no minimal truthmakers; one can always subtract, for each apple a, the sub-fact that
a in particular was eaten. How is relevance established when a sentence’s truth is overdetermined
via a chain of progressively weaker facts? The answer is that A’s truth would not have been as
overdetermined had Eve specifically not eaten b. The set of A’s obtaining truthmakers, had Eve
eschewed b but otherwise eaten just what she did eat, is a proper subset of the actual set.31
Grounding The proportion of apples eaten does not grow when we move b from the uneaten column
to the eaten column. But the set of apples eaten does grow, and its relative complement shrinks.
Proportions depend on relative cardinality. Cardinality depends in turn on set-membership; a set’s
size in the how-many sense (size#) is monotonically grounded in size in themembership sense (size).
Eve eats b (E) bears positively on Eve eats almost all the apples (A) because
Eve eats almost all the apples says that a set exceeds its complement in size#.
Size# is monotonically grounded in size .
Eve eats b bears positively on the set’s size , and negatively on its complement’s size .
Surprise It comes as quite a surprise, when almost all 's be  , that a randomly chosen ' turns out
not to be  . That the ' in question turned out to be  would not be surprising at all. How could it
not be good news for a hypothesis H, that things turn out a way that is (on H) just what you would
expect, rather than a way that would be (on H) surprising?
Explanation Confirmation has often been linked to explanation.32 (Crucially the notion of expla-
nation at work here is not — anyway not assumed to be — reducible to probability-raising. Correct
27How do the points composing a sphere contribute to its volume, when each point is of measure zero? Well, the points
do the job collectively, and one is exactly as helpful as another. (This relates to the issue of what principled difference there
could be between countable and uncountable additivity that would justify accepting one while rejecting the other) (Easwaran
[2013]).
28p occurs positively in the obvious propositional rendering ' of There are infinitely many true atoms, but verifying p alone
can never flip ' from false to true.
29In the case of ' (≈ There are infinitely many true atoms) we might try to explain this as follows. ' is redistribution-
equivalent to the conjunction over all n of There are at least n atoms. And p for each n occurs positively in There are at least
n atoms.




predictions are not per se explanatory, even if they do reduce surprise in some crude probabilistic
sense.)
1. Insofar as H would help to explain E, E (if true) is evidence for H.
2. For almost all the apples to be eaten potentially helps to explain why b was eaten.
3. For almost all the b-distinct apples to be eaten does nothing to explain why b was eaten.
4. So E is evidence for A but not (on these grounds, anyway) for B.
Such an argument doesn’t get off the ground unless explanation is hyperintensional; but the case
for this has been made many times.33 It is suggested as well by the hyperintensionality of counter-
factuals on the not implausible hypothesis that explanation is counterfactual-involving.34
18 Total Evidence, Perspicuous Evidence
That completes our short list of “considerations” favoring, or seeming to favor, E supports A over
E supports B. One might be curious too about the support if any that A offers to E — that Eve eats
almost all the apples offers to Eve eats b. If evidential support is understood (as by Bayesians) in
terms of conditional probability, then A will have to support E too — pr(X|Y) > X iff pr(Y|X) > Y.
This is an intriguing possibility but also, for reasons already hinted at, a troubling one.
Suppose we are considering whether or not to accept Eve eats b (Eb), when a trusted informant
says: Almost all apples are eaten (A). A counts in favor of Eb, we’re imagining, so learning it should
in some sense dispose us towards Eb — more anyway than learning B (Badapple aside, almost all
apples are eaten) would.
The problem is that A on anyone’s account is a priori deducible from B! Who is to say that our
informant wasn’t told B by her informant, inferring A from it before passing the news on to us? It
makes no sense in that case to raise our confidence in Eb, since B does not support Eb in the slightest.
Another way to think of it is that the A-testimony I receive can support Eb only it carries information
about b; and this is unlikely if my informant obtained A from B. Importantly the topic-changer could
be myself. There is nothing to stop me from inferring A from B before drawing conclusions about
badapple.35
The issue here is slightly reminiscent of one discussed by golden-age confirmation theorists like
Carnap. Imagine I am looking for evidence supporting some some hypothesis H. Unfortunately all I
have in my evidence book is a fact E that is thoroughly independent of H. But wait... E implies E∨H,
which does support H!36 I therefore decide to tell myself (truthfully) that E∨H. With no additional
investigation, I have gratified my desire for evidence in favor of H.
Where have I gone wrong? Carnap appeals in cases like this to a methodological “principle
which seems generally recognized, although not always obeyed.” He calls it the Principle of Total
Evidence:
if we wish to apply ... the theory of probability to a given knowledge situation, then we
have to take as evidence E the total evidence available to the person in question at the
time in question, that is to say, his total knowledge of the [situation] (Carnap [1947],
138)
33Sober [1982], Siebel [2011]
34How to reconcile IBE reasoning with the supposed primacy of Bayesian update is of course a huge question (Roche and
Sober [2013], McCain and Poston [2017]).
35Or I could engage in a kind of aboutness-laundering, telling you that B in hopes that “the information” will make its way
back to me as A.
36Bayesians will say this is because pr(H|E∨H) > pr(H). A hypothesis is always probabilified by its logical consequences,
extremal values aside.
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Not only does E∨H fall short of my full evidence, that evidence (E) screens E∨H off from H.
pr(H|E∨H) exceeds pr(H), but pr(H|E&(E∨H)) = pr(H|E) = pr(H).
Totality is a matter of logical strength. My total evidence is all that I know, or all I have just
learned, not something logically weaker than that. But there is in our E∨H example a subject matter
dimension as well. E in itself is off-topic (or so we may suppose); it has topicality thrust upon it by
the device of adding H as a disjunct. To bring out the contrast more clearly, let E&H be the new
disjunct rather than H. We then get a statement E∨EH that is logically equivalent to E but has a more
encompassing subject matter.
Does E∨EH differ evidentially from E? One certainly hopes not, if E∨EH was inferred from E.
But if we learn directly that E∨EH, matters are perhaps not so clear. Imagine E says that your coin
came up heads, H that mine did. If I am told that either your coin came up heads, or both of our coins
did, this may seem like good news for my coin coming up heads. One way for E∨EH to hold is via
its second disjunct; and its second disjunct says in part that my coin came up heads.
Return now to B (b aside, almost all apples are eaten). B considered in itself is off-topic when it
comes to Eb. But we can “make” it topical by adding a disjunct that is less indifferent to b. The new
disjunct could beEb itself; in that case the resulting disjunction is intensionally weaker than (properly
implied by) B. But it could also be A (Almost all the apples are eaten), resulting in a disjunction B∨A
that is intensionally equivalent to B.
Either approach yields a sentence with additional ways of being true, beyond B’s ways, whereby
b was eaten. The suggestion is that this is itself a kind of weakening. Enlarging the field of events
capable of witnessing a sentence’s truth makes that truth easier to arrange. Whether the new verifiers
bring in new worlds is a separate question — this occurs with Eb∨B, but not A∨B, and not for that
matter with A itself.37 A spurious evidential link with Eb can be manufactured not only by inten-
sionally weakening B (to Eb∨B), but also by merely-topically weakening it (to A∨B, or to A itself
(the two are hyper-equivalent).38
From this it seems we need a second principle, to the effect that one should not update on topical
weakeningsE− of one’s evidenceE either—not even ifE− is intensionally just as strong asE. Another
way to put it is that the evidence we update on should not have gratuitous, “extra” ways ! of being
true that were thrown in for no good reason. A story will be needed though, about what a no-good
reason looks like for giving ! a spot among our evidence-statement’s truthmakers.
Here is tentative first thought about this. Let T be our total evidence rightly so-called, the evidence
we ought to be updating on. ! has no right to be included among T’s truthmakers if the process by
which T reaches us can be seen in advance not to involve the fact (if it is one) that !.
Can E− be T by this standard? No, for ! was introduced in effect by fiat when we inferred E−
from E. If ! was not involved in the process by which E was learned, then the same holds for E−,
since inference from E does not give ! a way of getting in on the causal action. Our new principle—
call it the Principle of Perspicuity, though it might be seen as just a ways-adjusted form of Total
Evidence—should therefore be this:
take as your evidence an E with no ways of being true beyond those potentially impli-
cated in the process by which E is learned.
This principle helps to explain why A strikes us as supporting Eb more than B does. Assuming
with Perspicuity that an evidence-statement’s ways of being true are limited to states of the world
potentially implicated in our acquiring that evidence, the fact of b being eaten
(a) figures potentially in the process by which A is learned, but
(b) does not figure potentially in the process by which B is learned.
37A has the same truthmakers as A∨B: the set of all !-sequences of 3’s and —’s containing finitely many —’s.
38A is in another sense stronger than B; it “says more” (Holliday’s phrase) by having a larger subject matter. I speak of
weakening, because the larger subject matter comes in the form of additional ways of being true—additional “disjuncts”—and
adding disjuncts is (like removing conjuncts) a paradigmatic form of weakening,
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Small wonder then that A strikes us as supporting Eb, while B doesn’t. To gain confidence in
Eb based on evidence potentially sent your way by the fact that Eb seems only reasonable. To gain
confidence in Eb on the basis of evidence that would have come to you by the same route whether H
held or not — not so much.
19 Last Thoughts
I said that evidential support were understood (as by Bayesians) in terms of conditional probability,
then A has to support E if E support A — pr(X|Y) > X iff pr(Y|X) > Y.
But the Bayesian explication is out of the question here. For one thing, conditional probability is
ordinarily seen as intensional and A and B are intensionally equivalent. A deeper reason is brought
out by Builes’ Paradox and the critical reaction to it.39 Builes and Dorr et al point out that pr(E|A)
cannot differ from pr(E|B), if (as seems inevitable in this case) pr(A|B) = pr(B|A) = 1.40
Those who persist in believing that Almost all apples are eaten ought in some sense to boost our
confidence in b is eaten will have to pursue this idea using some sort of non-Bayesian apparatus still
undevised. 41 Resisting world domination (putting ways where worlds were) is necessary for this
purpose, or so we have argued. But it is nowhere near sufficient. I don’t know if probability theory
can be run on states of the world, or more or less specific ways for the world to be. If so that could
be just the ticket.
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